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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Mark Howard Pendleton appeals from the judgment entered upon the
jury’s verdict finding him guilty of possession of methamphetamine and his guilty
pleas to unlawful possession of a firearm and a persistent violator enhancement.
Pendleton asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because, he claims, the district court incorrectly concluded he did not have
standing to challenge the search of a locked closet located in an apartment
above a commercial building where he worked.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Pendleton with possession of methamphetamine and
unlawful possession of a firearm.

(R., pp.83-84, 213-214.1)

The state also

alleged Pendleton is a persistent violator. (R., p.215.) Pendleton filed a motion
to suppress, asserting “the officers did not have articulable facts sufficient to
justify probable cause for a search warrant,” and that no exception to the warrant
requirement applied.

(R., pp.39-40; see also pp.72-74, 94-96.)

At the

suppression hearing, at which Pendleton proceeded pro se, the state indicated
that based on assertions Pendleton made in some of his pleadings, Pendleton
was required to demonstrate he had standing to search by providing evidence
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Page citations to the record correspond to the electronic file, “Clerk’s
Record.pdf.”
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that he was residing at the location of the search.

(Tr.2, p.46, Ls.7-15

(prosecutor’s comments), p.50, Ls.9-10 (Pendleton indicating he is representing
himself).) In an effort to establish standing, Pendleton testified that he “did not
reside at the location,” but “was employed by the fellow that owned the building,”
and he “expect[ed] a certain amount of privacy” to perform his job. (Tr., p.52,
Ls.11-12, p.53, Ls.13-25.) Pendleton also testified that he “had tools at that
building,” and “had certain responsibility to secure the building.” (Tr., p.54, Ls.1719.)

The district court determined that, based on the evidence Pendleton

presented, he failed to establish he had standing to challenge the search;
accordingly, the court denied Pendleton’s motion to suppress. (Tr., p.60, L.11 –
p.62, L.17.)
Pendleton proceeded to trial at which the jury found him guilty of the
possession of methamphetamine charge. (R., pp.300, 303.) Pendleton pled
guilty to the firearm charge and the persistent violator enhancement. (See R.,
pp.301, 327.) The court imposed a unified ten-year sentence, with three years
fixed, for the methamphetamine charge and a concurrent unified five-year
sentence, with three years fixed, for the firearm charge.

(R., pp.327-328.)

Pendleton filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.332-335.)
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There are several transcripts included in the record on appeal. All “Tr.”
references in this brief are to the transcript that includes the February 19, 2015
hearing on Pendleton’s motion to suppress. The only other transcript reference
in this brief is to the preliminary hearing held on August 13, 2014, which will be
cited as “P.H. Tr.”
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ISSUE
Pendleton states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it determined Mr. Pendleton did not
have standing to challenge the search of the building?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Pendleton failed to show error in the district court’s determination that
Pendleton was not entitled to suppression since Pendleton failed to show he had
standing to challenge the search of a locked closet located in an apartment
above a building where he worked?
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ARGUMENT
Pendleton Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying His
Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Pendleton contends the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress based on its conclusion that Pendleton failed to meet his burden of
showing he had standing to challenge the search.

(Appellant’s Brief, p.11.)

More specifically, Pendleton claims the district court determined Pendleton “could
not have standing unless [Pendleton] claimed the building was his place of
residence,” which Pendleton asserts is incorrect because “one may have
standing to challenge the search of one’s workplace.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.11.)
Pendleton further argues that he “had standing to challenge the search because
he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched that society is
willing to recognize as reasonable.”
arguments fail for several reasons.

(Appellant’s Brief, p.11.)

Pendleton’s

Pendleton not only misstates the district

court’s ruling, the record shows he failed to provide sufficient evidence at the
suppression hearing, and the facts and the applicable law show that, even if the
evidence presented was sufficient, Pendleton failed to show he had standing to
challenge the search of a locked closet located in an apartment above a
commercial building where he worked.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the

4

trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).
C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded Pendleton Failed To Meet His
Burden Of Showing He Had Standing To Challenge The Search Of A
Locked Closet Located In An Apartment Above A Commercial Building
Where He Worked
A “defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the

challenged conduct invaded his own legitimate expectation of privacy rather than
that of a third party.” State v. Brown, 113 Idaho 480, 484, 745 P.2d 1101, 1105
(Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted). Thus, “[a] person challenging a search has
the burden of showing that he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the item or place searched.” State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 626, 181 P.3d 1231,
1234 (2008) (citations omitted); see also State v. Hanson, 142 Idaho 711, 718,
132 P.3d 468, 475 (Ct. App. 2006) (“the burden to show a privacy interest in the
place searched is on the defendant; the State has no responsibility to go forward
with the evidence on this issue”). Whether such an expectation exists requires a
court to determine (1) whether the individual had a “subjective expectation of
privacy in the object of the challenged search,” and (2) whether “society is willing
to recognize that expectation as reasonable.” Id. The first inquiry is a question
of fact, and the second is a question of law. Id.
A defendant may also enjoy limited Fourth Amendment protections in
relation to his workplace. The Supreme Court has held that the “capacity to
claim the protection of the Amendment depends not upon the property right in the
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invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which there was a
reasonable expectation of freedom from government intrusion.”
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).

Mancusi v.

“It has long been settled that one has

standing to object to a search of his office, as well as of his home,” and standing
to raise a Fourth Amendment claim does not require “legal possession or
ownership of the searched premises.” Id. at 369 (citations omitted). However,
even with respect to a workplace, the defendant must show a subjective
expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. Id. at
368. Pendleton has failed to meet his burden of showing he had standing to
challenge the search in this case for several reasons.
It is nearly impossible to evaluate the merits of Pendleton’s standing claim
in light of the dearth of evidence presented at the suppression hearing.
Pendleton filed a motion to suppress “any and all evidence, testimony and/or
information related to the investigation of the circumstances referenced in the
probable cause statement in this case.” (R., p.39.) In his motion, Pendleton did
not identify any particular evidence, testimony, or “information” he believed
should be suppressed.

(See generally id.)

Nor was there any evidence

presented at the suppression hearing indicating what evidence was seized during
the search, where it was seized from, or what “testimony” or “information”
resulted from the allegedly unlawful search.

(See generally Tr., pp.46-62.)

There was also no evidence presented as to the scope of the search conducted
or the type of building where the search occurred. (Id.) Pendleton referred to it
as a “building” where he “did work” and kept tools. (Tr., p.52, Ls.11-12, p.54,
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Ls.6-7, 17-18.) The district court, on the other hand, referred to the location of
the search as a “residence.” (Tr., p.61, Ls.2, 13.)
On appeal, Pendleton provides context for the search by citing testimony
from the preliminary hearing. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.1-4.) The preliminary hearing
transcript reveals that law enforcement responded to a request from Pendleton’s
parole officer3 to assist with a search of Pendleton’s residence, which resulted in
the discovery of a pistol, several pellet guns, paraphernalia, and several baggies
of methamphetamine in different places in the apartment. (P.H. Tr., p.4, L.2 –
p.6, L.24, p.12, Ls.14-18, p.14, L.21 – p.16, L.25.)

Detective Paul Egbert

described the location as “an upstairs apartment” located “[a]bove a building that
has been a commercial building off and on” and, at the time, “the downstairs part”
was “under renovation.”

(P.H. Tr., p.12, L.25 – p.13, L.3.)

A female who

identified herself as Pendleton’s daughter told Detective Egbert that one of the
bedrooms in the apartment was hers. (P.H. Tr., p.13, Ls.22-24, p.28, Ls.14-17.)
Detective Egbert also testified that one of the bedrooms had men’s clothing in the
dresser and hanging in the closet, and that the apartment looked “lived in”
because, in addition to the clothing, it was furnished with couches, chairs, and a
television, and there was “food in the kitchen.” (P.H. Tr., p.14, Ls.1-3, p.31,
Ls.22-24, p.38, Ls.15-24.)

3

Although the word “probation” was frequently used during the preliminary
hearing, the magistrate presiding over that hearing clarified that Pendleton was
on parole, not probation. (P.H. Tr., p.42, Ls.6-8.) This finding is consistent with
the parole agreement the state submitted with its written response to Pendleton’s
suppression motion in support of its claim that the search was conducted
pursuant to Pendleton’s consent. (R., pp.46-55.)
7

The preliminary hearing transcript was not, however, offered as evidence
for the court’s consideration at the suppression hearing.

(See generally Tr.)

Thus, it cannot be relied on for purposes of reviewing the district court’s denial of
Pendleton’s suppression motion. See Sun Valley Co. v. City of Sun Valley, 109
Idaho 424, 437, 708 P.2d 147, 160 (1985) (citations omitted) (“It is hornbook law
that an appellate court will not consider evidence not presented to the district
court.”), abrogated on other grounds by Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass’n, 140
Idaho 536, 96 P.3d 637 (2004); State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 233 P.3d 52
(2010) (quotations and citation omitted) (“Findings of fact are not clearly
erroneous if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence.”). Given
the lack of evidence presented at the suppression hearing about the nature of the
location searched, including where different items were discovered, Pendleton
cannot establish he met his burden of showing he had standing to challenge the
search of any location where evidence was actually obtained, much less that he
would be entitled to suppression of any or all of the evidence discovered.
Even if this Court concludes the evidence Pendleton presented at the
suppression hearing was sufficient to consider the merits of his standing claim, or
if the Court also considers the unadmitted testimony from the preliminary
hearing, Pendleton has still failed to meet his burden of showing he had standing
to challenge the search.
At the preliminary hearing, Pendleton objected to the characterization of
the location of the search as his residence, and argued that he was not in
“control of the closet,” which was locked, where the drugs and “everything except
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for th[e] rifle” were found. (P.H. Tr., p.5, Ls.13-19, p.21, Ls.3-24, p.44, Ls.12-16.)
Similarly, at the suppression hearing, Pendleton testified that he did not reside at
the location of the search, but “was employed by the fellow that owned the
building,” “did work at the building,” and “had tools at that building.” (Tr., p.52,
Ls.11-12, p.53, Ls.24-25, p.54, Ls.6-7, 17-18.) Based on Pendleton’s testimony,
the district court found:
The Court accepted testimony from the Defendant that he
does not reside at this residence; that he did work at this location;
that he has some responsibilities, which – clean out the building,
has responsibility to secure the building; that he never permanently
resided there; that he hadn’t lived there for three months; but that at
the time that is in question, he was sleeping at a separate
residence, 65 North 111 East, at a cousin’s residence; and he
definitively states that he has not resided and does not reside at
this residence [belonging to his employer, Mr. Corona].
And so based upon that, Mr. Pendleton, the question before
the Court is whether or not the items that were retrieved at this
residence should be suppressed.
The Court can’t make a finding that they should be
suppressed without some initial standing. And if you’re claiming
today that this is not your place of residence, then the Court simply
. . . cannot proceed any further.
(Tr., p.61, Ls.1-18.)
The district court then addressed whether there was any “authority
involving [the] workplace and whether an employee has some expectation of
privacy at a workplace,” and stated:
I’m confident that there is some authority that relates to that.
I have in my own mind my own understanding as to how far that
authority will go, but I can say very clearly today that, based upon
the testimony that the Court has heard today, the Court can make
no finding that there was any expectation of privacy established by
you based upon your assertions today.
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(Tr., p.62, Ls.6-15.)
On appeal, Pendleton contends the district court erred by “determin[ing]
Mr. Pendleton could not have standing unless he claimed the building was his
place of residence.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.11 (citing Tr., p.61, Ls.14-18); see also
p.13 (same citation).) This argument ignores the entirety of the district court’s
comments, particularly the comments specifically acknowledging there is “some
expectation of privacy at a workplace,” and the court’s finding that Pendleton
failed to show any expectation of privacy on that basis.
Pendleton next argues that he “had standing to challenge the search of
the building because he had a subjective expectation of privacy in his workplace
that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.13.) With
respect to the first prong of the legal analysis – whether Pendleton had a
subjective expectation of privacy – Pendleton correctly notes that he testified that
he felt he had “plenty of” “standing” since he “work[ed] for a gentleman that owns
the building,” he “did work at the building,” and “had [his] tools at the building.”
(Tr. p.54, Ls.7-12; Appellant’s Brief, p.13 (citing Tr., p.54, Ls.6-20, p.61, Ls.1-5).)
“But that is not enough. The extrinsic facts must demonstrate the expectation to
be legitimate—that is, to be objectively reasonable.” State v. Holman, 109 Idaho
382, 386, 707 P.2d 493, 497 (Ct. App. 1985). Pendleton asserts he satisfies this
requirement as well, arguing that “[m]uch like the private office discussed in
Mancusi, [he] could reasonably have expected that he would not be disturbed in
the building, as his workplace, except by personal or business invitees.”
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(Appellant’s Brief, p.16.)

A review of Mancusi shows why this argument is

frivolous.
At issue in Mancusi was the search of “an office shared by DeForte and
several other union officials,” which search uncovered documents used to convict
DeForte of several criminal charges. 392 U.S. at 365. The record in that case
“reveal[ed] that the office where DeForte worked consisted of one large room,
which he shared with several other union officials.” Id. at 368. “DeForte spent ‘a
considerable amount of time’ in the office,” and “had custody of the papers at the
moment of their seizure.” Id. The Court found that DeForte had “standing to
object to the admission of the papers at his trial,” reasoning:
[I]t seems clear that if DeForte had occupied a ‘private’ office in the
union headquarters, and union records had been seized from a
desk or a filing cabinet in that office, he would have had standing.
In such a ‘private’ office, DeForte would have been entitled to
expect that he would not be disturbed except by personal or
business invitees, and that records would not be taken except with
his permission or that of his union superiors. It seems to us that the
situation was not fundamentally changed because DeForte shared
an office with other union officers. DeForte still could reasonably
have expected that only those persons and their personal or
business guests would enter the office, and that records would not
be touched except with their permission or that of union higher-ups.
Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369.
Mancusi does not stand for the proposition that an employee has standing
to challenge a search of an entire building in which he works.

Contrary to

Pendleton’s analogy, a “private office” is not “[m]uch like” an entire building in
which an office is located. (Appellant’s Brief, p.16.) While Pendleton could,
under the rationale of Mancusi, theoretically have a legitimate privacy interest in
some part of the building in which he worked, he did not have a reasonable
11

expectation of privacy in the entire building just because he “did work at the
building,” “had tools at that building,” or even because he had “responsibility to
secure the building.” (Tr., p.54, Ls.7, 17-19.) Pendleton’s claim actually fails
under Mancusi because Pendleton failed to establish, as the defendant in
Mancusi did, that the items sought to be suppressed were located in a particular
place inside the building over which Pendleton had a reasonable expectation of
privacy. As noted, there was no evidence at the suppression hearing on this
point. Reference to other portions of the record to ascertain whether such a
connection exists demonstrates it does not.

If, as Pendleton argued at the

preliminary hearing, “everything except for th[e] rifle” was in the locked closet that
he did not have “control of,” then regardless of whether Pendleton worked at the
building and stored tools elsewhere in the building, Pendleton disclaimed
ownership of the contents of the locked closet. Thus, Pendleton had neither a
subjective interest in the closet or its contents, nor an interest that society would
recognize as reasonable. See State v. Melling, 160 Idaho 209, ___, 370 P.3d
412, 415 (Ct. App. 2016) (“Idaho courts have held that disclaimer of ownership or
possession constitutes abandonment,” and “[s]ociety is not willing to recognize a
privacy interest in abandoned property.”).
Other portions of the record also defeat Pendleton’s workplace standing
claim. The testimony at the preliminary hearing was that the place where the
search was conducted and the items were seized was an apartment where
people were living, not a workplace. (P.H. Tr., p.13, Ls.3-18, p.38, Ls.15-24.)
The construction work being performed in the building was in the “bottom part of
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the home.” (P.H. Tr., p.37, Ls.17-19; see also p.13, Ls.2-3.) Pendleton did not
have standing to challenge the search of a locked closet located in a residence
upstairs from where he was doing construction work just because the two were
located in the same building. Pendleton’s claim that the district court erred in
concluding he lacked standing is without merit.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdict finding Pendleton guilty of possession of methamphetamine
and Pendleton’s guilty pleas to unlawful possession of a firearm and a persistent
violator enhancement.
DATED this 2nd day of August, 2016.

/s/ Lori A. Fleming for_____________
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2nd day of August, 2016, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
BEN P. McGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

JML/dd

/s/ Lori A. Fleming for____________
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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